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C
onferences sponsored by Federal
Reserve Banks tend to focus on well-
defined, policy-oriented topics related
to issues faced by policymakers and
the economic research staff. Such con-
ferences present an opportunity for
academics to pursue research considered policy-
relevant by Federal Reserve Banks, not only because
the work may influence policy but also because it
helps promote ongoing interaction between policy-
makers and leading researchers. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta hosted a
conference on monetary policy and learning on
March 21–22, 2003.1 The conference papers and
discussions are part of an emerging literature that
introduces the process of learning into dynamic
macroeconomic models.2 Recent technical advances
have enabled the analysis of dynamic models that
include a role for learning (about the economy or
about the model used by policymakers). In some
models, monetary policymakers learn about the
workings of the economy while in others private
agents learn about the model(s) the central bank
uses to formulate monetary policy.
By focusing on this specific area of research, the
conference brought together policy advisers and
researchers currently investigating closely related
topics to promote interaction and synergies that
may propel further research on monetary policy
and learning. The conference participants and the
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attendees included leading researchers at universi-
ties and central banks as well as policy advisers and
monetary policymakers from around the world. 
This article outlines the implications of some of
the conference papers and summarizes the ensuing
discussion, focusing on broad themes that have rele-
vance for monetary policy. As a setup to this discus-
sion, the first section describes the Phillips curve
framework, a common simplified model of the macro-
economy, and outlines key issues raised in Sargent
(1999) about how to interpret monetary policy
behavior and economic performance over the past
few decades using this model and different assump-
tions about learning. Following from that work, the
conference papers focusing on understanding the
recent economic history of inflation attempt to detect
the role of monetary policy behavior in generating
the recent, more benign inflation performance. The
discussion then reviews the implications from confer-
ence papers that model learning behavior in a variety
of settings. The article also follows up on some impli-
cations from the literature relating to central bank
transparency, its relevance for effective communi-
cation to the public about monetary policy, and its
likely role in future learning models. Finally, the
article introduces Lars Svensson’s speech at the
conference (published in this issue of the Economic
Review), which describes a monetary policy frame-
work and highlights the role of transparency for effec-
tive monetary policy in that framework.2 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
A simplified expectations-augmented Phillips curve
can be expressed as
(1) U = U* – θ (π – π e),
where U is the unemployment rate, U* is the nat-
ural rate of unemployment, θ is the Phillips curve
parameter, π is the inflation rate (set by the policy-
maker), and π e is the public’s expectation of the
inflation rate.
There is economic slack in this framework if the
unemployment rate exceeds the natural rate (or
actual output is less than potential output). The eco-
nomic slack implies that firms do not fully utilize
existing capacity and thus generate less wear and
tear on capacity and productive resources (excess
capacity); the slack should thus dampen the rate of
increase in labor compensation and in other input
costs. During slack periods, firms typically eschew
raising prices because price increases in an economy
with weak demand will potentially reduce sales and
market share. As a result, the approach predicts
lower inflation rates in times when the unemploy-
ment rate is above the natural rate (or when output
is less than potential, that is, a positive output gap
exists). Conversely, if unemployment falls below the
natural rate (or output exceeds potential), the con-
dition signals serious strain on scarce productive
inputs. In that case, scarcity induces suppliers to
bid up the prices of inputs (labor, capital, and other
inputs) as producers try to increase productive
capacity in order to produce desired output. As a
result, firms’ output prices rise. This train of events
contributes to rising inflation. Note that the inflation
dynamics of these models are driven by real eco-
nomic phenomena, in contrast to monetary phe-
nomena as in Friedman (2003), although monetary
factors are likely operating in the background.
Varieties of Explanations and Stories
I
n the mid-1970s the basis for macroeconomic
forecasting and policy analysis was macroeco-
nomic models incorporating Keynesian features and
hinging on an empirical relationship—the Phillips
curve—notably, without augmenting the models for
expectations. In these unaugmented models, policies
could be perceived as choices of unemployment and
inflation from along a curve, as if policymakers could
“trade off” lower unemployment by allowing higher
inflation. Over time, policymakers were faced with
accumulating empirical evidence—the simultane-
ous observation of high unemployment and rising
inflation—that was inconsistent with their model
predictions. Partly in response to these empirical
The Monetary Policy Problem
W
hat economists describe as the “monetary pol-
icy problem” has a variety of interpretations.
For a policymaker using a stylized monetary model,
the problem might boil down to determining the
choice of an optimal path for the policy variable (say,
the federal funds rate of interest) in a given eco-
nomic model to achieve key objectives, such as
chosen target values for output and inflation. In a
model, the policymaker has an objective function
to maximize and a policy tool with associated
(assumed) effects on the target objectives. From a
practical policymaking perspective, the problem
may be defined more generally as implementing
monetary policy consistent with policy goals.
Federal Reserve System goals (more or less) include
financial stability, desirable output, and inflation
outcomes. How to achieve those goals might repre-
sent the monetary policymaker’s problem.
The monetary policy problem is extraordinarily
complex, and modeling that complexity for practi-
cal policy implementation has not been success-
ful. Instead, most macroeconomists simplify the
policy issue to concentrate on key macroeconomic
measures central to the monetary policy process—
the average performance of the inflation rate and
the unemployment rate (or a real output measure).
A popular economic framework used to model
monetary policy assumes a loss function for the
policymaker in which the central bank aims to
generate an average inflation rate consistent with
small fluctuations around the natural rate of
unemployment (or, comparably, deviations of out-
put away from potential output). The observed
outcome should not deviate much from the best
achievable combination of the inflation rate, the
expected inflation rate, and unemployment.3 The
policymaker believes the expectations-augmented
Phillips curve describes the way in which devia-
tions of the inflation rate from the public’s expec-
tations of that rate drive the unemployment rate
away from the natural rate of unemployment.4
From a practical policymaking perspective,
the monetary policy problem may be defined
generally as implementing monetary policy
consistent with policy goals.1. The late Bruce Smith of the University of Texas at Austin offered the conference planners the idea and provided the inspira-
tion for holding a conference on this topic.
2. The conference papers are available on the Atlanta Fed’s Web site (www.frbatlanta.org) on the News & Events/Conferences
page. Some of these papers will eventually be published in the Review of Economic Dynamics.
3. The speech by Svensson (in this issue) describes in more detail how this framework has become the bulwark model among
central bankers in industrialized countries and how monetary policy implementation can be improved through its use.
4. The output gap, rather than the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, can be the device that detects the degree of slack in
the economy.
5. These models were technically challenging to solve and computationally demanding to estimate. Typically, statistical tests
rejected the model predictions. Initial modeling efforts offered limited policy implications, or the policy implications were
often not palatable to policymakers. Whereas statistical tests often rejected the model predictions, the introduction of
rational expectations produced insights toward more rigorous and productive modeling strategies and has led to offshoots
such as learning.
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contradictions, an innovative strand of the macro-
economic literature took as its core element the
formulation of expectations by economic agents.
Models with rational expectations imply that out-
comes on average match the expectations of par-
ticipants in the economy (Sargent 1999, 136).5
Concentration on the role of expectations led to a
heightened appreciation of the role expectations
play in determining economic outcomes and led to
adaptations of existing models, like the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve.
The interaction between macroeconomic policy
and observed macroeconomic performance stimu-
lated research on issues that are now considered
central to monetary policy and to the research in
the learning literature. The figure above, displaying
the inflation rate from 1960 to 2002, highlights a
sharp disparity in observed inflation rates: Inflation
during the 1960s and 1990s was much lower than
the high inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s.
Explaining what caused the difference in inflation
rates has been the focus of much macroeconomic
research and is a common element of several con-
ference papers. The observation is important for
monetary policy analysis because some explana-
tions blame inappropriate monetary policy for the
high inflation of the 1970s and 1980s.
Sargent (1999) examines the 1970s inflation, the
1980s disinflation, and the low inflation since the
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policymakers into making the mistakes of a prior
generation and resulting in higher-than-desired
inflation rates.
The two alternative descriptions above implicitly
place central bank policy as the primary cause of
the “Great Inflation” in the United States. But the
question of Federal Reserve culpability for the
behavior of inflation is unsettled and is the topic of
substantial empirical research. 
Empirical results in Sims (1999) and in Bernanke
and Mihov (1998a, 1998b) imply that Federal Reserve
monetary policy was not responsible for rising infla-
tion in the 1970s nor for the mild inflation of the
1990s. Rather, causes external to the monetary pol-
icy process were the primary source of inflation
fluctuations. Namely, the U.S. economy was hit with
exogenous shocks that were simply much worse in
the 1970s and early 1980s than in the other periods.
Sims demonstrates that the volatility of exogenous
shocks declined in the 1990s and that the parame-
ters of econometric estimates that involve monetary
policy parameters do not change significantly over
time. The model with fixed parameters and time-
varying volatility of shocks fits the data relatively
well. The unchanged parameter estimates suggest
that the Fed made policy in the usual manner
throughout the sample and that the volatility and
severity of the economic shocks over these periods
differed dramatically. Hence, unexpected shocks
underlie the inflation outcomes; the Fed was lucky
in the 1990s and unlucky in the 1970s.6
Taylor (1997), De Long (1997), and Romer and
Romer (2002) focus on how monetary policy out-
comes have improved over time. Taylor suggests that
there was a systematic change in how monetary pol-
icy was implemented in the late 1980s and 1990s.
More forcefully, the Romers, as mentioned above,
argue that monetary policy was ill conceived in the
1970s and caused the high inflation, which required
Paul Volcker, then chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, to initiate a substantial recession in order to
reduce the rate of inflation. With the “improved
policy” arguments, the empirical prediction is that
the policy parameters drift over time because the
changes in parameters are associated with different
monetary policy procedures or policy regimes. The
underlying assumption is that monetary policies are
important for describing and determining the
observed inflation outcomes. 
Distinguishing between these two explanations
for the behavior of inflation over recent economic
history has been challenging because it is difficult to
detect drift or changes in parameters separately from
fluctuations in the volatility of exogenous shocks.
recent economic history. He describes one interpreta-
tion as the “triumph” of the natural rate; the combi-
nation of the rational expectations assumption with
the natural rate theory of unemployment produces a
monetary policy implication that recommends policy-
makers should aim only at low inflation. Policies that
attempt to achieve unemployment rates lower than
the natural rate will cause rising inflation. In other
words, rational expectations–natural rate models
indicate that good monetary policies recognize the
futility of trying to devise monetary policies that
attempt to permanently alter the unemployment rate. 
An alternative explanation described by Sargent—
the vindication of econometric policy evaluation—
blames inappropriate monetary policy for the infla-
tion of the 1970s and credits improved monetary
policy for lower inflation outcomes since the 1980s.
Consistent with this view, Romer and Romer (2002)
argue that Fed policymakers overestimated the
growth potential of the U.S. economy (or similarly,
they believed that the natural rate of unemployment
was lower than it really was). In a standard output
gap model for price dynamics, an overestimate of
potential output (or an underestimate of the nat-
ural rate of unemployment) generates a policy error
that leads to rising inflation. According to Sargent
(1999), policymakers learn about the parameters
of a “true” Phillips curve model that underlies the
data. The policymaker uses an adaptive model, one in
which the coefficients of the forecasting model are
updated in light of new information. In this setting,
this model with learning can explain the rise and fall
of inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. As Sargent (1999)
describes the explanation, Fed policy improved,
despite using a misspecified model, because econo-
metric evidence accumulated and indicated that
there was no exploitable trade-off between unem-
ployment and inflation. The bad news, though, is that
over time the same methodology—accumulating
evidence from econometric estimates of a misspec-
ified model—might suggest a more benign and
perhaps exploitable trade-off, potentially tempting
Models with learning incorporate assumptions
about what agents know about the economy
and how policymakers choose the economic
model as the basis for policy analysis.6. Sims (2001) suggests that policy may fluctuate between “regimes” reflecting more or less responsiveness to inflation shocks
and that these regimes reflects temporary shifts in policy activism, not systematic improvement. This argument is more subtle
than those discussed in the text. 
7. Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, 1998b) also find weak evidence for parameter drift and find support for unchanged parameter
estimates and time-varying volatility of shocks for their reduced-form VAR (vector autoregression) model. 
8. The Nash inflation rate is the suboptimal inflation rate consistent with a self-confirming equilibrium in which the policymaker
learns about the underlying expectations-augmented Phillips curve model, as in Sargent (1999).
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The conference paper by Cogley and Sargent (2003)
addresses these empirical challenges and tries to
design more powerful empirical tests to distinguish
between “the Fed got lucky” and “the Fed policy
improved” interpretations. Specifically, the model
(made up of unemployment, the federal funds rate,
and consumer price index [CPI] inflation) includes
both time-varying parameters and time-varying
shock volatility and tries to uncover whether param-
eter drift takes place. Empirical evidence from one
test indicates that the parameters drift over time, but
other test results are unable to indicate such drift.
Although the results contrast with those of Sims
(1999), the authors conclude that this is not a com-
pelling contradiction.7 Still, the finding of parameter
drift begs for additional research on the question. Del
Negro (2003), in his discussion of the Cogley and
Sargent paper, adds commodity prices to their model
to test robustness of the results. Del Negro shows
that the parameter drift results are robust to this
model alteration and notes a strong positive covari-
ance between commodity and consumer prices. The
positive covariance may indicate that underlying
exogenous shocks (reflected in commodity prices)
drove the high inflation outcomes, offering support
to the luck hypothesis. Further research may aim
toward deriving more powerful tests to distinguish
between time-varying elements resulting from
volatility versus parameter drift.
In macroeconomic models, it has been difficult to
match fully specified statistical models to the high
inflation and disinflation in the 1970s and 1980s.
Schorfheide (2003) estimates a fully specified model
that allows for regime shifts in monetary policy (that
is, from a low- to a high-inflation regime and vice
versa), and the public learns over time about which
regime presides. The statistical tests support the
full-information model, but there are some peculiar-
ities that make those tests less compelling. Instead,
Schorfheide wants to interpret the disinflation of the
1980s as being more consistent with the delayed
response of a learning model than with a full-
information model. Harald Uhlig, the discussant,
remarked that interesting questions remain regarding
why the average inflation rate increased, namely,
whether policymakers simply raised the implicit infla-
tion target (or tolerated higher inflation) or the sever-
ity of exogenous shocks increased over the period.
Bullard and Eusepi (2003) investigate whether a
large portion of 1970–80s inflation was a result of
unobserved changes in productivity. In their set-
ting, the central bank faces problems monitoring
and learning about productivity growth. In the theo-
retical model, monetary policy uses a Taylor rule,
which sets the short-term interest rate in response
to measures of the output gap that could be mis-
measured as a result of negative productivity shocks.
The paper offers simulation results for the model
under a variety of learning specifications. The model
specification in which both the private sector and
the central bank learn provides results that are most
consistent with the 1970s inflation arising from mis-
perceived productivity estimates. The discussant,
Mark Gertler, prefers an explanation of the inflation
history that focuses on how policymaking has
improved. He views recent inflation regimes as
reflecting the evolution of monetary policy toward a
better equilibrium and is more comfortable with
modeling learning specifications like those in Sargent
and Williams (2003), in which the central bank learns
about the true model from estimating models with
more and more data.
Models with learning incorporate assumptions
about what agents know about the economy and
how policymakers choose the economic model as
the basis for policy analysis. Learning models may
also examine what policymakers know or believe for
a particular class of learning rules given the macro
model. Sargent and Williams (2003) characterize the
shifts in monetary policy outcomes between sub-
optimal to nearly optimal inflation in an equilibrium
model with learning. The authors investigate whether
a monetary policy model can display an inflation
rate below the Nash inflation rate (above optimal
rate) in the form of “escapes.”8 In their paper, the
government has prior beliefs about how much param-
eter variation is present in their misspecified Phillips
curve model. The authors gauge how different val-
ues of the parameter that controls “prior belief”
affect the simulation results. In this paper, the gov-
ernment does not know the true model of the
economy, but the public understands the process6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
specification also suggests that the central bank will
produce better policy outcomes if policies respond
to forecasts (expectations) of both the public and
the policymaker rather than to data outcomes. This
result does not arise in a rational expectations spec-
ification. In the learning model, the central banker
monitors the inflation expectations of private market
participants as well as making its own forecasts of
inflation, and it can improve policy by responding
to the public’s expectations of inflation. The public’s
expectations provide an additional information
source for the central bank since they inform the
policymaker about the imperfect model the public
uses to forecast inflation. This result is consistent
with Svensson’s, who refers to the public’s expecta-
tions as “independent state variables” and describes
practical methods for central banks to utilize private-
sector expectations. 
Leeper and Zha (2003) investigate how a central
bank might implement monetary policy by using a
(misspecified) model estimated from actual U.S.
data. The authors use this estimated model as the
laboratory for policy experiments to determine
whether the model, though misspecified, can still
provide useful policy analysis for a central bank. In
the model setting, the public does not really know
how the central bank determines monetary policy
decisions. As a result, the public tries to learn and
understand, by observing data and the Fed actions
over time, how the central bank makes decisions
and how that behavior affects economic outcomes.
The public can use these observations for inferring
whether the central bank has changed its policy
behavior, but detecting small departures from an
established “standard” policy behavior is difficult.
As a result, most of the routine adjustments to mon-
etary policy—that is, standard behaviors—are
unlikely to affect the public’s typical economic behav-
ior in response to those policy adjustments. The
empirical experiments indicate that an approximate
or misspecified model may still provide reasonable
forecasts of implied responses to modest policy
interventions. Only large changes in monetary policy
poke through the noise to send a clear signal of
“policy change” to the public and then disrupt stan-
dard responses to policy interventions. In other
words, monetary policy can use misspecified models
with reasonable effectiveness in many cases. 
Sims (2003) explores the effects of costly infor-
mation flow using the concept of rational inatten-
tion—that there is a limit to how much information
a human being can process (or chooses to process)
about economic data. People have more interest in
everyday living than in constantly checking and
that governs policymaking. The government learns
about the economy from estimating misspecified
models; the government’s subjective ideas about the
model affect the behavior of the data, and the sub-
jective ideas are also a function of the data. For
example, the policymaker’s prior beliefs affect eco-
nomic outcomes, so policymaker beliefs are crucial
to isolating the outcomes likely to arise in these mod-
els. The self-confirming equilibrium result generates
higher-than-optimal inflation at the natural rate of
unemployment, and this equilibrium persists longer
when a strongly held prior belief restricts the time
variation in model parameters (that is, in the extreme,
the parameters are time invariant). 
The Sargent and Williams paper shows that mis-
specified models may eventually get close enough
to the true generating model’s equilibrium path to
produce the most desirable (Ramsey) outcomes for
inflation and output. These “escapes” to lower infla-
tion occur more frequently if the government has
less prior belief in a stable, Phillips curve relation-
ship (that is, it allows drifting parameters in the
model). One interpretation of Sargent and William’s
results is that a government that believes strongly
in its misspecified model will more likely achieve its
less preferred (higher-inflation) outcome, with fewer
opportunities to escape to the low inflation equilib-
rium. The practical implication of this analysis is
significant. By holding to a strongly held belief in a
stable, Phillips curve relationship and ignoring the
signals from data that the model parameters have
changed, central bank policy behavior supports the
Nash high inflation outcome. 
In contrast to Sargent and Williams, Orphanides
and Williams (2003) introduce learning on the part
of the public about the economy and policymaker
decisions. The specification of their model, compa-
rable to the one in Svensson (2003, this issue), raises
the sensitivity of the public’s inflation expectations
to shocks and generally reduces the influence of
policy on macroeconomic fluctuations relative to
a rational expectations specification. The learning
In most macroeconomic research, transparency
implies the clear communication of policy goals
as well as the policy tools aimed to achieve
these goals.7 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
evaluating new economic statistics. In preliminary
analysis, the ideas suggest that the public will not
react if there is a low signal-to-noise ratio (the data
are noisy and fluctuate for no significant reason).
But the public will react if economic signals are
strong enough and the effects are large enough. A
notable implication of Sims’s paper is that greater
policy transparency (here, making policy decisions
clear to the public) may raise the signal-to-noise
ratio and magnify policy effects on inflation and
output by more than just reducing uncertainty. The
implication, though, raises an issue of just what the
transparency of monetary policy should imply and
what form it should take.
Transparency and Learning
T
ransparency of monetary policy may be useful
for central bank accountability as well as for
improving policy effectiveness. The key issues sur-
round helping the public understand the goals and
views of the central bank and establishing ground-
work for support if the central bank is faced with
difficult policy decisions. Freedman (2002) sug-
gests that central banks generally believe that
increasing transparency improves monetary policy
outcomes. The problem with this view is that there
is no compelling empirical work that predicts unam-
biguous improvement to policy and to the economy
from moving toward further transparency. Cecchetti
and Krause (2002) suggest that central bank trans-
parency can reduce economic uncertainty by
removing the uncertainty produced by the central
bank itself. Measuring the degree of transparency
or effective transparency, however, is subject to
debate. Additional research measuring the value of
transparency for producing good monetary policy-
making is warranted. 
In most macroeconomic research, transparency
implies the clear communication of policy goals as
well as the policy tools aimed to achieve these goals.
The policymaker informs the public about what poli-
cies have been put in place and what those policies
are expected to produce—that is, the policymaker
lets economic agents know what policymakers are
thinking about the economy and how policy may
change if outcomes differ from earlier forecasts and
the forecasts change. These elements of trans-
parency imply that the policymaker lets the public
know the policy model or framework. The goals of
transparency are clear, as are procedures to gener-
ate it, in these models. In reality, the practical imple-
mentation of transparency and the communication
efforts to improve it are complicated. As Cukierman
(2002) emphasizes, tremendous ambiguity remains
about what policy model information should be con-
veyed to the public mainly because there is so much
controversy in the economics profession about the
correct model of the economy for policymakers to
use. Without an explicit model, it is difficult for the
public to detect a simple reaction function for policy,
and it is not clear that the objective function of the
policymaker, the approximate decision rule, or the
effective model underlying the forecasts is as trans-
parent as is implied in academic research. 
Kohn and Sack (2003) estimate whether there
are measurable effects of public announcement of
Federal Reserve System policy-related information
(as distinct from policy actions) on the volatility of
a selection of financial variables (yields). Notably,
this research investigates the effects of information
release on second moments—that is, volatility of
financial asset yields, which does not imply sizable
effects on mean yields. Kohn and Sack’s results,
using information from 1989 to 2003, suggest that
the release of the policy statement has some impact
on federal funds rate futures and short-term inter-
est rates, perhaps indicating that the statement
reflects some information about future policy
moves but not about longer-term Treasury issues.
The speeches of the Federal Reserve chairman
have little systematic effect on financial volatility.
Notably, the congressional testimony of the chair-
man that includes the FOMC economic outlook has
some effect on the volatility of longer-term yields,
perhaps an indication that markets glean inferences
about longer-term monetary policy as an update of
the economic forecasts of private market agents.
These initial findings suggest that the release of
central bank information may have an effect on the
economy separate from the policies themselves. At
this point, such information is at least associated
with more volatility in the yields of certain debt
vehicles. Whether the information is news or noise
to trade upon is not yet clear.
Transparency of monetary policy is a theme cen-
tral to Svensson’s policy framework and highlighted
Ambiguity remains about what policy model
information should be conveyed to the public
mainly because there is controversy in the
economics profession about the correct
model for policymakers to use.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
with unpleasant choices as policy options, make
decisions in the presence of great uncertainty, as
described above. From the practitioner’s viewpoint,
the implementation of monetary policy is a tricky
business. There is no user’s manual for policymak-
ers because the author would have to understand
monetary policy and the way it is transmitted to the
real economy. Among macroeconomists, the trans-
mission mechanism for monetary policy remains
subject to debate.
Amidst the imperfect understanding of monetary
policy and its interactions with the real economy,
it is surprising to find some agreement among cen-
tral banks about the way(s) monetary policy should
be implemented (see Bernanke 2003). This agree-
ment may reflect the difference between the eco-
nomics profession and central bank practitioners.
The central bank consensus framework centers on
a few basic assumptions about the impact of mone-
tary policy on private agents’ economic decision
making and thereby its effects on the real economy.
Using this consensus as its basis, Svensson’s speech
at the March conference serves as a current version
of a suggested user’s guide for monetary policymak-
ers to improve policy effectiveness. Needless to say,
learning about the evolution of monetary policy-
making will continue. 
in his speech, which follows in this issue. Increased
transparency with an explicit model may heighten
communication between private decision makers
and public policymakers. Svensson notes that trans-
parency of monetary policy should be a key element
of learning models but that it was somewhat over-
looked in the conference papers. The learning liter-
ature may help to evaluate the role of transparency
in producing good monetary policy, whereby clear
communication from the central bank to the public
may improve the way private agents learn about the
policymaker’s model. 
Transparency of monetary policy, though difficult
to achieve in reality, appears a noble goal; it is still
debatable how best to achieve that goal. Further
research should aim at making clear distinctions
about precisely what information would best com-
municate monetary policy intentions. Such research
would help make requests for greater transparency
more compelling and operative. 
A Workhorse Model for Central Banks—
and a Recommended Approach
M
onetary policy in reality is more complicated
than macroeconomic models, including the
learning models, propose. But policy is implemented
on a real-time basis, and policymakers, often faced9 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
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